Accounting information quality, governance efficiency and capital investment choice  by Zhai, Jinbu & Wang, Yutao
China Journal of Accounting Research 9 (2016) 251–266HO ST E D  BY Contents lists available at ScienceDirectChina Journal of Accounting Research
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate /c jarAccounting information quality, governance eﬃciency
and capital investment choicehttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cjar.2016.08.001
1755-3091/ 2016 Sun Yat-sen University. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
⇑ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: wangyutao@cufe.edu.cn (Y. Wang).Jinbu Zhai a, Yutao Wang b,⇑
aSchool of Public Finance, Central University of Finance and Economics, China
bSchool of Accounting, Central University of Finance and Economics, China
A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C TArticle history:
Received 22 May 2013
Accepted 4 August 2016





Capital investment choiceThis paper examines the relationship between accounting information quality
and capital investment choice from the perspective of accounting information’s
governance function. Measuring capital investment choice as the correlation of
growth of operating income between company and industry, this paper inves-
tigates whether and to what extent companies focus on their core business. The
results show that the higher the quality of publicly listed ﬁrms’ accounting
information, the stronger that correlation, particularly when the corporate
governance of the listed company is poor. The ﬁndings imply that accounting
information quality can thus optimize the capital investment choice, which
complements and strengthens the functioning of corporate governance. Hence,
regulators should pay more attention to the market’s power to supervise the
behavior of listed ﬁrms, improve the governance functions of accounting infor-
mation and increase the eﬃciency of capital allocation.
 2016 Sun Yat-sen University. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. This
is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecom-
mons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
China’s stock market has developed rapidly since 1990, when the capital market was set up. The number of
listed companies increased from 10 in 1990 to 2063 in 2010. In the 1990–2010 period, about 5253.7 billion yuan
in outside capital ﬂowed into listed companies by initial public oﬀerings, seasoned equity oﬀerings or corpo-
rate bonds (China Statistical Yearbook, 2011). Whether companies allocated the capital into their own core
businesses has become a very important issue, which more and more market participants are focusing on.
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operating activities, against their original investment plans. There are an average of 53 million yuan for each
change, the average 6.7 months of change frequency, and the average 3.6 times change for every ﬁrm. More-
over, almost 69.6% of all the changes are ineﬃcient. The frequent changes of the capital investment directions
have become a notable problem in China, which severely harms capital allocation eﬃciency. Many scholars
pay attention to this issue and research on it from the views of implementing laws and regulations or improv-
ing corporate governance, but the eﬀect of these suggestions is not good to date. Based on this important issue,
this paper examines the governance function of accounting information and whether high accounting infor-
mation quality can form an enforcement mechanism to push management to make capital investment more
eﬃciently.
Since China’s Accounting Law was implemented in 1985, the Chinese government has devoted eﬀort to
complete the accounting principles system and related rules to improve accounting information quality. In
2006, the Chinese Ministry of Finance issued new accounting principles comprising one basic accounting stan-
dard, 38 speciﬁc standards and application guides that have been applied to publicly listed companies since
2007. The goal of these standards is to ensure the ﬁrms to provide useful accounting information and to help
investors make good investment decisions. These accounting standards are created to reduce the information
asymmetry between investors and listed companies, helping investors better understand those companies’ risks
and thus make more rational investment decisions. However, in China’s current special institutional back-
ground, can accounting information also serve a governance function to inﬂuence managements’ capital
investment choice?
There are several objective external forces that enhance the governance function of accounting information
in China’s capital market. By the end of 2010, the country’s number of securities investment funds had reached
704, with 2.4228 trillion yuan in total assets (China Statistical Yearbook, 2011). Institutional investors also
play an important role in China to dig up and transfer the information disclosed by listed ﬁrms, compared
with other investors. More importantly, institutional investors can also respond more quickly to abnormal
accounting information, ‘‘vote by foot”, and ﬁnally improve the market eﬃciency. We believe that in the long
term, high-quality accounting information can help these investors to identify ineﬃcient investments, and in
turn incur the pressure on stock price by investors’ voting by foot. In an eﬃcient market, the potential
decrease in stock prices will further push management to make good investments. Meanwhile, other market
forces, such as individual investors and the media, have also begun to pay more attention to interpreting
accounting information, and thus ﬁnally constrain and supervise the managements’ investment behavior.
Hence, accounting information has become increasingly important in China to optimize corporate capital
investments.
This paper examines whether and how accounting information quality has an eﬀect on corporate invest-
ment choices, based on the governance function of accounting information. This issue is very important to
government, market participants, current and latent investors, and listed ﬁrms. Addressing this issue will help
them (such as market participants) better understand the governance function of accounting formations, so as
to help them make good decisions.
2. Literature review
Many researchers, both Chinese and foreign, have explored the role played by accounting information
quality and information transparency in market eﬃciency. For example, Zhou and Chen (2008) investigate
the inﬂuence of the transparency of industry accounting information on industry-level capital allocation based
on data from all A-share listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges from 1999 to 2004. They
measured capital allocation eﬃciency as the allotment of shares and amount of newly raised funds, focusing
on whether external capital ﬂows to the best industries. Zhou and Chen (2008) ﬁnd industry accounting infor-
mation transparency to exert a signiﬁcant eﬀect on resource allocation, such that the more transparent that
information is, the higher the eﬃciency of resource allocation.
Based on 3600 ﬁrm-year observations of A-share listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen
exchanges from 2004 to 2006, Li (2009) examines the inﬂuence of accounting information quality on the
under- and over-investment of listed companies. His results show that high-quality accounting information
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investment by ameliorating contracts and supervision, thereby improving capital allocation eﬃciency at the
company level.
Bhattacharya et al. (2003) investigate the inﬂuence of accounting opacity on the cost of equity capital in 34
countries, ﬁnding that the lower a country’s degree of accounting information transparency, the higher its
overall cost of equity capital and the smaller the trading scale of stocks. Hence, it appears that accounting
information transparency also has an inﬂuence on capital allocation eﬃciency at the country level. Using
the same 34 countries, Biddle and Hilary (2006) survey the eﬀects of accounting information quality on capital
investment eﬃciency (measured by the sensitivity of the amount of capital investment to net cash ﬂows in
operating activities, with the greater the sensitivity, the lower the degree of investment eﬃciency) at both
the country and company levels. Their results indicate that high-quality accounting information reduces infor-
mation asymmetry between managers and external capital providers, and therefore increase capital investment
eﬃciency at both levels. Drawing on these studies, Biddle et al. (2009) research company-level capital invest-
ment eﬃciency in depth from both the over- and under-investment perspectives, which focus on the relation-
ship between such eﬃciency and high-quality accounting information.
Using a sample of listed companies that had been examined by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) or sued by shareholders because of accounting information distortions or restated ﬁnancial state-
ments, McNichols and Stubben (2008) investigate the role of accounting information in internal decision-
making eﬃciency. Their results suggest that companies engage in over-investment during the periods of illegal
accounting activity, but exhibit higher investment eﬃciency after that activity has been investigated. Hence, it
appears that accounting information quality aﬀects companies’ internal decisions.
Based on 37 countries and 37 manufacturing industries for each country, Francis et al. (2009) examine the
eﬀect of country-level information transparency, rather than just accounting information quality, on resource
allocation eﬃciency. They use the growth rate correlations between manufacturing industries and countries to
measure resource allocations. The results show that the higher a matched country’s degree of information
transparency, the stronger the correlation of growth rate between industries and countries. Therefore, in coun-
tries with better information transparency environments, resources ﬂow more smoothly to better-developed
industries, resulting in more eﬃcient industry-level resource allocation.
Chen et al. (2011) investigate the association between accounting information quality and the investment
eﬃciency of private enterprises in emerging markets. They ﬁnd that even when accounting information is
of poor quality, it still exerts a positive inﬂuence on investment eﬃciency. Because private enterprises are
dependent primarily on bank ﬁnancing, the association is more obvious than in other scenarios.
The prior literature above examines not only the eﬀects of accounting information quality or transparency
on capital allocation eﬃciency at the country and industry levels, but also on company-level decision-making
and investment eﬃciency from the over- and under-investment perspectives. Based on the analysis of this
paper, listed companies frequently change the direction of their capital ﬂows on a large scale. Hence, whether
ﬁrms invest capital in their main businesses is a major factor in evaluating capital allocation eﬃciency. How-
ever, few studies focus on this issue. This paper thus makes two important contributions to the prior literature.
First, it explores the relationship between accounting information quality and a company’s choice of capital
investment in depth, with a focus on whether it invested capital in its core business. Second, it also examines
that relationship from the perspective of the market forces from which the governance function and eﬃciency
of accounting information arise.
3. Theoretical analysis and hypothesis development
Beaver (1989) argues that the major objective of accounting information was to help its users make
informed decisions. The quality of accounting information can be assessed in two ways. The ﬁrst is valuation
usefulness, which means that the information is useful to investors looking to make valuation decisions. It
reﬂects the pricing function of accounting information. The second is contract validity, which means that
the accounting information beneﬁts contracts, particularly those between investors and administrators. It
reﬂects the governance function of such information. Accordingly, accounting information has two basic func-
tions: pricing and governance. First, accounting information implements its pricing function by inﬂuencing
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ing the capital cost of external ﬁnancing (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Easley and O’Hara, 2004; Zeng and Lu,
2006). The pricing function can also be realized by inﬂuencing stock prices. To some extent, a listed company’s
stock price reﬂects special information about it. Higher quality, more transparent accounting information
allows growth opportunities to be incorporated into the stock price, thereby attracting new investors. Second,
by alleviating the ex-post information asymmetry among the interested parties to a contract, accounting infor-
mation can reduce the imperfections of the contract and restrain and monitor the opportunistic behavior of
management. In this way, accounting information serves a governance function. In the case of obtaining exter-
nal capital, that governance function of accounting information helps listed ﬁrms to make rational decisions to
focus on their main business and allocate the capital more eﬃciently.
Bushman and Smith (2003) ﬁnds that high-quality information disclosures are beneﬁcial to investors by
monitoring management, encouraging them to make investment decisions eﬃciently and eﬀectively, and
ﬁnally improving capital allocation eﬃciency and gaining more returns to investors. Ball and Shivakumar
(2005) believe that high-quality accounting information strengthens investors’ supervision of management,
by placing restrictions on managerial pay for their own or others’ interests and by optimizing investment
decision-making. In addition, high-quality accounting information can also inform investors in a timely man-
ner about the orientation of the ﬁrm’s capital investments and help them to supervise managerial activities.
Similarly, Biddle et al. (2009) argue that high-quality accounting information inhibits management from
building ‘‘an empire,” discourages unwise investments and improves the ability of investors to monitor the
eﬃciency of managers’ investment decisions. Fig. 1 shows how the two major functions of accounting infor-
mation aﬀect a company’s capital investment choice.
On the other hand, the aim of accounting disclosures was to provide external stakeholders with useful infor-
mation. The quantity and quality of accounting information will aﬀect an investor’s judgment on the intrinsic
value of the company. If the company’s share price or earnings declines, investors will seek to avoid losses
through such actions as ‘‘exercising their decision-making right to vote” and/or ‘‘voting with their feet.”
Hence, accounting data constitute an essential information resource in determining whether a company’s
stock price is over- or underestimated. Ohlson (2005) builds a model that reﬂects the relationship between
accounting information and ﬁrm value. Many scholars have demonstrated the usefulness of such information
by showing how investors use it to make decisions (Beaver, 1968; Ball and Brown, 1968). Investors are con-
cerned with the quality of accounting information because it helps them to better understand the company’s
operating situation and other fundamentals. High-quality accounting information aﬀords external stakehold-
ers a comprehensive understanding of ﬁrm fundamentals and allows them to take action to supervise manage-
ment behavior. Once managements’ activities are not aimed at maximizing the interests of stockholders, major
shareholders can seek to alter it by voting for changes on the board of directors and taking part in shareholder
meetings. Although minority shareholders are unable to inﬂuence management directly, they can inﬂuence the
stock price by voting with their feet. Institutional investors (and other strategic investors) can also eﬀect man-
agerial changes both through their right to vote for board directors and by voting with their feet. High-quality
accounting information thus helps external stakeholders, who can interfere with management either directly or
indirectly, to gain a better understanding of a company’s capital use and business performance, thereby aﬀect-
ing its choice of capital investment. Hence, the ﬁrst hypothesis of this paper is developed as following.Figure 1. Theoretical analysis framework.
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business.
Most of the listed companies were established during the country’s planned economy era. Hence, they have
close relationships with the government that were complicated by the ﬁscal decentralization reforms that
began at the end of the 1970s. Local governments’ pursuit of economic and political objectives is heavily
dependent on the listed companies under their control, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in particular. Mean-
while, the legal environment governing Chinese listed companies is in urgent need of improvement. The
incomplete nature of the regulatory system results in the companies not abiding by the law and the law not
being strictly enforced. It also remains diﬃcult for shareholders to ﬁle successful legal appeals, and thus eﬀec-
tively constrain or exert pressure on management.
Although listed ﬁrms in China have formally established boards of directors, in reality there are still a num-
ber of challenges to those boards’ independence. First, the majority of board members are also managers, par-
ticularly in SOEs, which result in serious internal control problems. The State-owned Assets Management
Department commonly appoints managers, which exacerbates these problems. Second, the role of indepen-
dent directors is questionable in China because their appointment is intended to meet the requirements of reg-
ulators rather than to strengthen corporate governance. Finally, independent directors are normally
nominated or appointed by the board chair, and thus constitute an extension of the chair’s relationship with
and control by the majority shareholders.
The scarcity of board independence and the complex external governance environment make it diﬃcult for
corporate governance mechanisms to exert any real eﬀect. Investors, in contrast, can exercise real external
supervision by voting with their feet in the case of unreasonable investments, thus placing management under
the threat of potential stock price revaluations and promoting the eﬃcient resource allocation. High-quality
accounting information can help investors to identify ineﬃcient investments, thereby leading to a potential
share price revaluation and putting pressure on the board of directors, which in turn push management to
focus on the company’s core business and improve the eﬃciency of capital allocation. Therefore, when a com-
pany’s internal and external governance environment is weak, the eﬀect of high-quality accounting informa-
tion on capital investment choice is more pronounced. Hence, we posit the second hypothesis.
H2. The inﬂuence of high-quality accounting information on management capital investment choices is more
pronounced when the external governance environment is poor.4. Research design
4.1. Measurement of accounting information quality
The prior literature measures accounting information quality by two approaches. The ﬁrst is measured as
earnings characteristics, such as accruals quality and earnings persistence, predictability, smoothing, aggres-
siveness and loss avoidance, mainly based on the ﬁnancial statements. The second method is to use a com-
pany’s stock price to measure the quality of accounting information, such as earnings value relevance,
earnings timeliness and earnings conservatism. This approach reﬂects investors’ recognition of accounting
information quality, which is aﬀected by factors such as the degree of capital market development and the
knowledge of individual professionals. Due to weak or not eﬃcient capital market in China, this paper mea-
sures accounting information quality as earnings-related characteristics based on ﬁnancial statement data. We
develop four measures to proxy for accounting information quality, such as Accruals Quality, Earnings Per-
sistence, Earnings Predictability and Earnings Smoothing. Meanwhile, for robustness, this paper also con-
structs a comprehensive measurement by ranking the four variables above.
4.1.1. Accruals quality
The Jones model and modiﬁed Jones model are frequently used to assess companies’ earnings management.
However, it is diﬃcult to measure the normal and abnormal components of accruals objectively and precisely.
Therefore, Dechow and Dichev (2002) devise another method to measure accruals quality that is based on
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closely the company’s past, present and future cash correspond to its accruals, the higher (lower) its accruals
quality is. This paper calculates accrual quality based on the DD model. It takes into account how well the
company’s accruals in the current period (year t) match its cash in the previous period (year t  1), current
period (year t) and next period (year t + 1):DTotalCurrentAccrual ¼ b0 þ b1CFOt1 þ b2CFOt þ b1CFOtþ1 þ et;
where DTotalCurrentAccrual stands for the company’s accruals in year t, which equals the current assets
change in year t minus current liability changes, minus the changes of cash and cash equivalent
changes in year t, plus change of short-term liability with interests in year t. CFO refers to the operating cash
ﬂow.
The regression residual means unrealized cash ﬂow, which is relative to the company’s expected accruals.
The standard deviation (r(residuals)) of all observation residuals is used to measure a company’s accrual qual-
ity. A greater standard deviation means both lower accrual and accounting information quality. We calculate
accrual quality by using these variables during the past 10 years for each ﬁrm.
4.1.2. Earnings persistence
Using time-series data, the persistence of a company’s earnings is measured by regressing its current ROAt
on its previous ROAt1 (Lev, 1983; Ali and Zarowin, 1992). The model is as follows.ROAt ¼ a0 þ a1ROAt1 þ e;
where ROAt represents the return on assets in period t. Regression coeﬃcient a1 indicates the level of earnings
persistence, with a larger a1 indicating a higher earnings persistence. For ease of explanation, we take negative
value of earnings persistence, which implies a larger a1 is poorer quality accounting information. We calcu-
late this measure by using data during the past 10 years for each ﬁrm.
4.1.3. Earnings predictability
Earnings predictability describes the ability of a company’s current earnings to predict its future earnings. It
is measured by the same model as that for earnings persistence, i.e.,ROAt ¼ a0 þ a1 ROAt1 þ e:
The standard deviation of the residuals (r(residuals)) obtained from the regression can be used to measure the
prediction error in company earnings, with larger r(residuals) indicating poorer earnings predictability or
accounting information quality. We calculate this measure by using data during the past 10 years for each
ﬁrm.
4.1.4. Earnings smoothing
Our measure of earnings smoothing is based primarily on the shift between accruals and cash in net income,
which can be measured by the ratio of the standard deviation of net income to operating cash ﬂow or by the
correlation between changed accruals and operating cash ﬂow in the current period. As the principles of the
two methods are both based on the shift between accruals and cash in net income, they should produce the
same results.
Here, we use the ratio of the standard deviation of net income to operating cash ﬂow, that is, r(net income)/
r(operating cash ﬂow), where a larger ratio suggests a greater degree of artiﬁcial earnings smoothing and
lower degree of accounting information quality. We calculate this measure by using data during the past
10 years for each ﬁrm.
4.1.5. Comprehensive index of accounting information quality
As we are unable to ascertain which measurement of accounting information quality above is the most
important, we construct a comprehensive variable of accounting information quality according to the
approach used in the prior literature (Bhattacharya et al., 2003; Biddle and Hilary, 2006). We calculate each
unique measurement of accounting information quality for all ﬁrm-year observations, and then sort them by
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measurement to obtain the comprehensive index of accounting information quality. The smaller the rank
value, the better the comprehensive quality of the accounting information.
4.2. Capital investment choice
A company’s capital investment choice refers simply to whether the capital it controls ﬂows to its core
business. Properly describing and measuring capital investment choice, however, is very complicated.
Francis et al. (2009) measure resource allocation eﬃciency as the correlation between the growth rate
of the manufacturing industry to which a focal company belongs and that of a matched sample of com-
panies in the same industry to determine whether capital ﬂows to the most eﬃcient industries at the
national level. If a company’s capital ﬂows to its main business or main industry, there should be a high
degree of correlation and consistency between the ﬁrms’ operating proﬁts growth and that of the industry
as a whole. Therefore, referring to Francis et al. (2009), this paper measures capital investment choice as
the correlation between the growth rate of its own operating income and that of the industry as a whole
based on the data during the past 10 years. The higher this correlation, the more capital that ﬂows into
the company’s core business. In calculations, we take the average of the operating income growth of all
companies apart from the focal company as the industry-level value. The variable growth_corrt represents
the correlation between a company’s operating income growth and that of the industry in year t.
Industries are divided into 13 types in accordance with the industry classiﬁcations released by the China
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). In robustness tests, we also use both the correlation of the





growth_corr Correlation between operating proﬁt growth at the company and industry levels, calculated over a 10-year cycle
Explanatory variables
Accrual quality Company accrual quality calculated on a 10-year cycle and analyzed by rank value
Smoothness Company earnings smoothness calculated on a 10-year cycle and analyzed by rank value
Persistence Company earnings persistence calculated on a 10-year cycle and analyzed by rank value
Predictability Company earnings predictability calculated on a 10-year cycle and analyzed by rank value
TAQ Company overall accounting information quality calculated by the sum of the four independent accounting
information variables
Control variables
Shr1 Ownership concentration measured by the mean of the largest shareholder’s stake in a listed company during the 10-
year period considered
Hfd_5 Degree of ownership restriction measured by the means of a listed company’s second to ﬁfth largest shareholders’
Herﬁndahl index during the 10-year period
Mktscore Degree of marketization in the region in which the listed company is located measured by the China marketization
index compiled by Fan and Wang (2009)
Size Company size measured by the logarithmic average assets of the listed company over 10 years
MTB Corporate growth potential measured by the MTB mean of all listed companies in the 10-year period
ROA Corporate proﬁtability measured by the average ROA of the listed company in the 10-year period
r(sales) Volatility of sales measured by the company’s standard deviation of revenues (standardized by assets at the previous
year end) during the 10-year period
Leverage Company debt level measured by the mean of the asset-liability ratio of all listed companies during the 10-year period
OperatingCycle Company operating ability measured by the logarithmic average operating cycle of the listed company during the 10-
year period
Industry Dummy variable conforming to CSRC industry classiﬁcation
Table 2
Descriptive statistics.
Mean Std.Dev. Min. Median Max. Obs. Time horizon
Accrual quality 0.0404 0.0437 0.0017 0.0291 0.5258 711 2008
Persistence 0.4411 0.8369 2.9954 0.4738 50.936 4503 2000–2009
Predictability 5.7386 43.6854 0.1018 3.0127 2036.1048 4503 2000–2009
Smoothness 0.9514 1.9316 0.0239 0.6101 51.0512 2519 2007–2009
TAQ 18.4505 8.9761 1.0000 18.0000 36.0000 711 2008
growth_corr 0.1881 0.3499 0.9097 0.1987 0.9955 5407 2000–2009
Accrual quality, persistence, predictability and smoothness are calculated using the relevant model and a 10-year cycle and analyzed by their
raw values. TAQ is calculated by summing up the four independent accounting information variables’ decile rank values, and growth_corr
is the correlation between operating income growth between the ﬁrm and its industry on the basis of the past 10-year cycle.
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The control variables in this paper are ﬁrm size, ﬁrm growth, proﬁtability, operational volatility, debt ratio,
operating cycle and industry ﬁxed eﬀects. The deﬁnitions of these control variables are listed in Table 1.4.4. Model speciﬁcation
Regression models (1) and (2) are used to test H1 and H2, respectively:1 Th
The ovgrowth corrit ¼ a0 þ a1Rank of AQit þ a2SHr1it þ a3Hfd 5it þ a4Mktscoreit þ a5Sizeit þ a6MTBit
þ a7ROAit þ a8rðSalesÞit þ a9Leverageit þ a10OperatingCycleit þ e: ð1Þ
growth corrit ¼ a0 þ a1Rank of AQit þ a2GOVER þ a3Rank of AQit  GOVER þ a4Sizeit þ a5MTBit
þ a6ROAit þ a7rðSalesÞit þ a8Leverageit þ a9OperatingCycleit þ e: ð2ÞIn model (1), growth_corrt represents the correlation between the company and industry operating income
growth rates from years t  9 to t. Rank of AQit (accounting quality) represents the accounting information
quality, including accruals quality, earnings persistence, predictability and smoothness, and total accounting
quality (TAQt). Due to big standard deviation of actual value of these variables, this paper takes the ranking
value in decile level. The smaller the rank value of these measures, the higher is the accounting information
quality. Total accounting quality (TAQt) is the sum of all four single variables’ rank values in year t.
In model (2), growth_corrt is the same as in model (1), but total accounting quality (TAQt) is used as a sub-
stitute for Rank of AQit.
1 GOVOR represents the corporate governance mechanism, such as Shr1, Hfd_5 and
Mktscore. Due to the highly correlations among the corporate governance variables, we test each variable sep-
arately to address potential multicollinearity in the model. The coeﬃcient of AQt  GOVER allows us to infer
whether the eﬀects of accounting information quality on the capital investment choice are more pronounced
with better corporate governance.5. Data and empirical findings
5.1. Sample and data
All data and all variables come from the Wind Database. With 10 years adopted as the calculation cycle
and data of operating cash ﬂow disclosed from 1998 onward, this paper calculates the measurements of
accounting information quality and capital investment choices based on diﬀerent time horizons. The descrip-is article also analyzes the rank values of the four single variables: accruals and earnings persistence, predictability and smoothness.
erall result is consistent with that based on total accounting quality (TAQt). Owing to space limitations, these results are omitted.
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values are listed in Table 2.
We know that the smaller the value of the ﬁve accounting information quality variables, the better the qual-
ity of the accounting information. In Table 2, earnings predictability has a mean value of 5.74 with a standard
deviation of 43.69%, which indicates that it is easier to distinguish accounting information quality than the
other four variables. Earnings persistence has a mean value of 0.44 and a standard deviation of 0.84. The
comprehensive index of accounting quality, TAQ has a mean value of 18.45, and its minimum value and max-
imum values are 1 and 36, respectively. The maximum value of growth_corr is 1 and its minimum value is
0.91, which demonstrates that there are considerable inter-company diﬀerences in capital investment choice.
Table 3 reports the correlation matrix for the key variables.
Table 3 results (for both the Pearson and Spearman coeﬃcients) show that the four independent measures
of accounting information quality are strongly correlated with one another at the 1% signiﬁcance level, which
indicates that all four are important measures. At the same time, the comprehensive accounting information
quality variable is signiﬁcantly correlated with all of the independent variables (at the 1% signiﬁcance level).
More importantly, the results of both the Pearson and Spearman coeﬃcients show that TAQ has a signiﬁ-
cantly negative correlation with growth_corr at the 1% signiﬁcance level, which suggests that the higher the
level of comprehensive accounting information quality, the higher the governance eﬃciency, and the higher
likelihood the ﬁrms focus on its core business.
The measurements of accounting information quality, such as accrual quality, persistence, predictability and
smoothness have a negative correlation with growth_corr, signiﬁcantly in Spearman index (at the 1% signiﬁ-
cance level), but not in Pearson index. This univariate tests show that the higher the quality of the accounting
information the higher likelihood the company will focus on its core business.
5.2. Univariate analysis
For each independent variable, all of the sample ﬁrms are sorted by decile ranks in ascending order, and
divided into groups 1–10, with the smaller the group number, the higher the quality of accounting informa-
tion. Then, taking the median and mean of growth_corr in each group, we map the relationship between
accounting information quality and capital investment choice, as shown in Fig. 2.
The direction of the curves in Fig. 2 depends on whether the independent variables or comprehensive vari-
able are used in the calculation. The lower the level of accounting information quality, the smaller the medianTable 3
Correlation matrix for key variables.
Accrual quality Persistence Predictability Smoothness TAQ growth_corr
Accrual quality 1.00000 0.18186 0.88455 0.57421 0.65123 0.03226
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.3918)
Persistence 0.20200 1.00000 0.21560 0.10588 0.45280 0.04553
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.2266)
Predictability 0.86502 0.34943 1.00000 0.75685 0.58587 0.03297
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.3814)
Smoothness 0.64843 0.09898 0.70526 1.00000 0.40354 0.07013
(<.0001) (0.0085) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0624)
TAQ 0.86905 0.51453 0.93651 0.77887 1.00000 0.16026
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
growth_corr 0.13373 0.09704 0.16568 0.12250 0.17040 1.00000
(0.0004) (0.0098) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
This table presents the Pearson and Spearman correlation matrices. The upper-right diagonal reports the Pearson correlation coeﬃcients,
and the lower-left diagonal the Spearman correlation coeﬃcients in bold. The accrual quality, persistence, predictability and smoothing
variables are calculated on the basis of the relevant model and a 10-year cycle, and are analyzed by their decile rank values, TAQ is
calculated by summing up the four independent accounting information variables and growth_corr is the correlation of company- and
industry-level operating income growth over the 10-year cycle. The numbers reported in parentheses are p values.
Figure 2. Relationship between growth_corr and accounting information quality.
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invests its capital primarily in its main business and the quality of its accounting information, thus oﬀering
further evidence for this article’s main assumption.
For examining the correlation between accounting information quality and capital investment choices, we
classify the full sample into two groups based on two diﬀerent methods. The ﬁrst is to sort all sample ﬁrms by
decile rank from smallest to largest into 10 groups, with the top and bottom 10% of ﬁrms constituting the
high- and low-quality information groups, respectively. The second is to divide the sample into two groups
by the median of accounting information quality, with the top 50% of the sample deﬁned as the high-
quality group, and the bottom 50% deﬁned as the low-quality group. Table 4 reports the diﬀerence of invest-
ment choice between high and low quality of accounting information.
Table 4 shows that there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the mean of growth_corr between the higher and lower
quality groups based on two diﬀerent classiﬁcation methods, except for persistence. For example, the mean of
growth_corr in the higher quality group is 0.1902, signiﬁcantly higher (at the 1% signiﬁcance level) than 0.0707
in the lower quality group for smoothness. These univariate results support our prediction, that is, accounting
information quality has a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the choice of capital investment.5.3. Multivariate analysis
Based on the regression model (1), Table 5 reports the multivariate results.
Table 5 shows all the results based on diﬀerent measurements of accounting information quality. Except for
persistence in model (2), all other measurements have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on capital investment choice, which
support H1. The results imply that higher quality accounting information makes a ﬁrm more inclined to invest
its capital in its core business.
For testing H2, Table 6 reports the results of the joint inﬂuence of corporate governance and accounting
information quality on capital investment choice. Taking the comprehensive measure of accounting informa-
tion quality (Rank of AQ) as main variable, columns (1)–(3) of Table 6 show diﬀerent cross-sectional results
based on the diﬀerent measures of corporate governance, such as biggest shareholders ownership(Shrl), the
Herﬁndahl index of second to ﬁfth largest shareholders’ ownership (Hfd_5) and market index (Mktscore) from
Fan and Wang (2009). Column (4) shows the results when the three measures of corporate governance are
included in one regression model. Table 6 shows that the coeﬃcients on Rank of AQ are all signiﬁcantlyTable 4
Diﬀerences in capital investment choices between the high- and low-quality accounting information groups.
Bottom 10% versus top 10% groups Bottom 50% versus top 50% groups
Mean diﬀerence of growth_corr t-value Mean diﬀerence of growth_corr t-value
Independent accounting information quality
Accrual quality 0.1118 1.91* 0.0963 3.66***
Persistence 0.0058 0.24 0.0088 0.85
Predictability 0.018 4.73*** 0.0743 7.16***
Smoothness 0.1902 5.72*** 0.0707 5.01***
Comprehensive accounting information quality
TAQ 0.2005 3.62*** 0.0987 3.75***
The results are reported for the two sample-division methods (i.e., bottom 10% versus top 10% and bottom 50% versus top 50%), and the
variables are deﬁned as follows. Accrual quality, persistence, predictability and smoothness are calculated on the basis of the relevant model
and a 10-year cycle, and analyzed by decile rank value, TAQ is calculated by summing the four independent accounting information
variables and growth_corr is the correlation of operating proﬁt growth between the company and industry calculated based on the 10-year
cycle. The mean diﬀerence in growth_corr is the diﬀerence in means between the two subsamples, and the t-value column reports the t-
values of the tests for the equality of means.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% levels (two-tailed t-tests).
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% levels (two-tailed t-tests).
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% levels (two-tailed t-tests).
Table 5
Eﬀect of accounting information quality on the choice of capital investment.
Variables Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) Column (5)
Accruals quality Persistence Predictability Smoothness TAQ
Intercept 0.8461** 0.7955*** 0.6763*** 0.6615*** 0.7455*
(2.24) (5.24) (4.44) (3.26) (1.93)
Rank of AQ 0.0113** 0.0019 0.0059*** 0.0084*** 0.0035**
(2.27) (0.96) (2.92) (3.26) (2.08)
Shr1 0.0286** 0.0213** 0.0242** 0.0279** 0.0236**
(2.30) (2.02) (2.21) (2.26) (2.19)
Hfd_5 0.2767** 0.2575** 0.2114** 0.2073** 0.2174**
(2.15) (2.12) (2.09) (2.04) (2.11)
Mktscore 0.0037** 0.0093*** 0.0094*** 0.0071*** 0.0069***
(2.19) (3.21) (3.26) (2.89) (2.66)
Size 0.0531*** 0.0465*** 0.0421*** 0.0430*** 0.0495***
(3.08) (6.56) (5.91) (4.60) (2.83)
MTB 0.0035 0.0054*** 0.0044** 0.0024 0.0034
(0.86) (2.69) (2.16) (0.93) (0.83)
ROA 0.3464 0.7589*** 0.6924*** 0.4749 0.2569
(0.62) (3.44) (3.16) (1.60) (0.46)
r(Sales) 0.0032 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0021
(0.16) (0.37) (0.24) (0.39) (0.11)
Leverage 0.0185 0.0326 0.0248 0.0316 0.0171
(0.21) (0.88) (0.67) (0.65) (0.19)
OperatingCycle 0.0080 0.0110* 0.0088 0.0042 0.0105
(0.53) (1.85) (1.47) (0.53) (0.70)
Industry/year Control Control Control Control Control
Obs. 678 4195 4195 2416 678
Adj. R2 8.89% 8.44% 8.85% 8.34% 8.87%
This table presents the regression results on the eﬀect of each accounting information quality characteristic and TAQ on the choice of
capital investment. The variables are deﬁned as follows: Rank of AQ is calculated by the decile rank value based on the raw values of
accrual quality, persistence, predictability and smoothness; TAQ is calculated by summing the four independent accounting information
variables; Shr1 is measured by the mean of the largest shareholder’s stake in the focal listed company in the 10-year period under study;
Hfd_5 is measured by the mean of the company’s second to ﬁfth largest shareholders’ Herﬁndahl index during the 10-year period;
Mktscore is measured by the China marketization index compiled by Fan and Wang (2009); Size is measured by the logarithmic average
assets of the listed company during the 10-year period; MTB is measured by the MTB mean of all listed companies during the 10-year
period; ROA is measured by the company’s average ROA during the 10-years period; r(sales) is measured by a company’s standard
deviation of revenues (standardized by assets at the previous year end) during the 10-year period; Leverage is measured by the mean of the
asset-liability ratio of all listed companies during the 10-year period; OperatingCycle is measured by the company’s logarithmic average
operating cycle during the 10-year period; and Industry is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the ﬁrm is in an industry conforming to the
CSRC industry classiﬁcation standard, and 0 otherwise.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% levels (two-tailed t-tests).
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% levels (two-tailed t-tests).
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% levels (two-tailed t-tests).
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mation quality in column (1)–(3) are positive for Rank of AQ  Shrl, negative for Rank of AQ  Hfd_5 and
negative for Rank of AQ Mktscore, all signiﬁcant at the 5% level, suggesting that accounting information
quality plays a more important role in guiding a company to choose the right investment when the corporate
governance environment is ineﬃcient. In other words, the results imply that there is a complementary relation-
ship between such quality and the corporate governance mechanisms.
6. Robustness tests
For robustness, we also perform the following tests.
Table 6
Cross-sectional analysis of the eﬀect of accounting information quality on the choice of capital investment.
The model with diﬀerent governance mechanism variables Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4)
Intercept .5964 0.07082* 0.9122** 0.6631
(1.53) (1.83) (2.27) (1.62)
Rank of AQ 0.0119*** 0.0047** 0.0048*** 0.0079**







Rank of AQ  Shrl 0.0230** 0.0288**
(2.16) (2.60)
Rank of AQ  Hfd_5 0.0058** 0.0040**
(2.12) (2.11)
Rank of AQ Mktscore 0.0012** 0.0011**
(2.43) (2.37)
Size 0.0520*** 0.0512*** 0.0510*** 0.0509***
(3.01) (2.98) (2.94) (2.92)
MTB 0.0025 0.0035 0.0035 0.0029
(0.62) (0.84) (0.86) (0.70)
ROA 0.2019 0.2713 0.2047 0.1481
(0.36) (0.49) (0.37) (0.26)
r(Sales) 0.0025 0.0022 0.0012 0.0015
(0.13) (0.11) (0.06) (0.08)
Leverage 0.0057 0.0159 0.0109 0.0017
(0.06) (0.18) (0.12) (0.02)
Operating Cycle 0.0110 0.00112 0.0128 0.0127
(0.75) (0.75) (0.86) (0.85)
Industry/year Control Control Control Control
Obs. 675 675 675 675
Adj. R2 5.46% 4.98% 5.14% 6.26%
This table presents the regression results of the interactive eﬀect of corporate governance and accounting information quality on the choice
of capital investment. The variables are deﬁned as follows: Rank of AQ is calculated by the decile rank value based on the raw values of
accrual quality, persistence, predictability and smoothness; TAQ is calculated by summing the four independent accounting information
variables; Shr1 is measured by the mean of the largest shareholder’s stake in the focal listed company in the 10-year period under study;
Hfd_5 is measured by the mean of the company’s second to ﬁfth largest shareholders’ Herﬁndahl index during the 10-year period;
Mktscore is measured by the China marketization index compiled by Fan and Wang (2009); Size is measured by the logarithmic average
assets of the listed company during the 10-year period; MTB is measured by the MTB mean of all listed companies during the 10-year
period; ROA is measured by the company’s average ROA during the 10-year period; r(sales) is measured by a company’s standard
deviation of revenues (standardized by assets at the previous year end) during the 10-year period; Leverage is measured by the mean of the
asset-liability ratio of all listed companies during the 10-year period; OperatingCycle is measured by the company’s logarithmic average
operating cycle during the 10-year period; and Industry is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the ﬁrm is in an industry conforming to the
CSRC industry classiﬁcation standard, and 0 otherwise.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% levels (two-tailed t-tests).
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% levels (two-tailed t-tests).
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% levels (two-tailed t-tests).
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The main analysis and variables above in this paper are based on a relatively long time period (i.e.,
10 years), which unavoidably result in the problem: are the results above driven by other unobservable infor-
mation? Meanwhile, the endogeneity problem also arises, as a company’s choice of capital investment is likely
to aﬀect accounting information quality. To address these issues and problems, we control for growth_corr in
t  1 period (growth_corrt1) in regression model (1), and the results are presented in Table 7.
Table 7
Endogeneity analysis of the eﬀect of accounting information quality on the choice of capital investment.
Variables Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) Column (5)
Accruals quality Persistence Predictability Smoothness TAQ
Intercept 0.6249*** 0.3661*** 0.2877*** 0.2519*** 0.6055***
(2.83) (3.79) (2.97) (2.09) (2.71)
Rank of AQ 0.0054* 0.0031 0.0021* 0.0030** 0.0018*
(1.80) (1.55) (1.66) (1.99) (1.85)
growth_corrt1 0.8168
** 0.7887** 0.7878** 0.7963** 0.8162***
(38.46) (81.43) (81.25) (68.32) (36.42)
Shr1 0.0213** 0.0168** 0.0152** 0.0224** 0.0204**
(2.17) (2.11) (2.03) (2.43) (2.02)
Hfd_5 0.2850** 0.2138** 0.2153** 0.2147** 0.2605**
(2.23) (2.13) (2.18) (2.11) (2.17)
Mktscore 0.0023** 0.0051*** 0.0054*** 0.0032** 0.0027**
(2.56) (2.81) (3.03) (2.54) (2.26)
Size 0.0315*** 0.0163*** 0.0236*** 0.0150*** 0.0310***
(3.12) (3.62) (3.00) (2.69) (3.06)
MTB 0.0027 0.0001 0.0004 0.0017 0.0028
(1.14) (0.04) (0.33) (1.14) (1.18)
ROA 0.5591* 0.3154** 0.2543* 0.2891* 0.5171
(1.73) (2.26) (1.84) (1.66) (1.59)
r(Sales) 0.0143 0.0000 0.0001 0.0003 0.0137
(1.27) (0.01) (0.14) (0.75) (1.22)
Leverage 0.0120 0.0214 0.0146 0.0183 0.0112
(0.23) (0.89) (0.61) (0.64) (0.22)
OperatingCycle 0.0004 0.0019 0.0026 0.0001 0.0015
(0.05) (0.50) (0.69) (0.10) (0.17)
Industry/year Control Control Control Control Control
Obs. 675 3972 3972 2380 675
Adj. R2 68.28% 64.05% 64.01% 67.60% 68.29%
This table reports regression results on the eﬀect of each accounting information quality characteristic and TAQ on the choice of capital
investment when the endogeneity problem is considered. The variables are deﬁned as follows: Rank of AQ is calculated by the decile rank
value based on the raw values of accrual quality, persistence, predictability and smoothness; TAQ is calculated by summing the four
independent accounting information variables; Shr1 is measured by the mean of the largest shareholder’s stake in the focal listed company
in the 10-year period under study; Hfd_5 is measured by the mean of the company’s second to ﬁfth largest shareholders’ Herﬁndahl index
during the 10-year period;Mktscore is measured by the China marketization index compiled by Fan and Wang (2009); Size is measured by
the logarithmic average assets of the listed company during the 10-year period;MTB is measured by theMTBmean of all listed companies
during the 10-year period; ROA is measured by the company’s average ROA during the 10-years period; r(sales) is measured by a
company’s standard deviation of revenues (standardized by assets at the previous year end) during the 10-year period; Leverage is
measured by the mean of the asset-liability ratio of all listed companies during the 10-year period; OperatingCycle is measured by the
company’s logarithmic average operating cycle during the 10-year period; and Industry is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the ﬁrm is in an
industry conforming to the CSRC industry classiﬁcation standard, and 0 otherwise.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% levels (two-tailed t-tests).
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% levels (two-tailed t-tests).
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% levels (two-tailed t-tests).
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are still signiﬁcantly negative at least the 10% level (except for persistence). Thus, the results are consistent with
Table 5.6.2. Measurement of the capital investment choice
For robustness, this paper ﬁnally refers to the ideas of Morck et al. (2000) about stock price synchronicity,
and uses the synchronicity of operating income growth between industry and ﬁrm level as an alternative mea-
surement of capital investment choice. This new measurement is based on the following model.Growth Firmt ¼ a0 þ a1Growth Indust þ e;
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of the industry to which the company belongs (using the median of other companies’ operating income growth
in the same industry). We obtain the R-square (R2) from the regression model above, which reﬂects the degree
to which the industry’s growth rate explains that of the company. A higher R2 indicates greater synchronicity
between the operating income growth rates of the company and industry. Based on this new measurement, the
new results are consistent with those reported (untabulated due to space limitations).
7. Conclusion
This paper examines whether and how high-quality accounting information can push management to opti-
mize the capital investment choice of listed ﬁrms. This is a very important issue. Addressing this issue can help
researchers to realize the governance functions of accounting information. The empirical results show that the
higher the accounting information quality is, the higher the correlation and synchronicity of operating income
growth between the listed ﬁrm and its industry. Moreover, the relationship between accounting information
quality and capital investment choice is more pronounced when the corporate governance environment is
poor. These results imply that high-quality accounting information serves an important governance role,
which can supervise and push management to optimize capital investment choices, and ﬁnally maximize stock-
holders’ interests.
This paper has several important contributions. First, this paper provides new empirical evidence in a
developing capital market. Second, this conclusion implies that regulators need to build a transparent and reli-
able information environment to allow accounting information to play an eﬀective role to push listed ﬁrms to
focus on their core business, optimize ﬁrms’ capital investment choices, and ﬁnally increase resource allocation
eﬃciency. Finally, this paper can also help researchers to better understand and realize the governance role of
accounting information, and push them to investigate the other role of accounting information deeply and
broadly.
One limitation of this paper is that we assume that a company’s investment choice is eﬀective only when it
invests capital in its core business. It is of course possible that a better choice for some companies would be to
change their current business (rather than increasing the level of investment in their core business), particularly
in the case of an industry recession or excess capacity. Therefore, the relationship between accounting infor-
mation quality and capital investment choice may diﬀer with the diﬀerent development stage of the industry.
Maybe this issue is an important topic for future research.
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